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Distant recombination and the creation of basic
inventions: an analysis of the diffusion of public and
private sector nanotechnology patents in Canada
Abstract
This article explores whether the relationship between the breath of technological
integration (recombination distance) and the breath of an invention’s subsequent
application (basicness) is moderated by the sector of activity (private or public),
science-linkage strength and industry characteristics. Our analysis of Canadian
nanotechnology patents granted between 1990 and 1997 shows that although pri-
vate organizations generally yield smaller rates of basic inventions than public
organizations, increases to recombination distance by the former increases inven-
tion basicness at a higher rate; increasing reliance upon basic science moderates
the relationship between recombination distance and basicness; and increases to
recombination distance in emerging science-based industries increases invention
basicness at a higher rate. These findings have implications regarding the debate
around the efficiency of the academic enterprise model.
Keywords: Academic enterprise, Markets for technology, Search heuristics,
Capabilities, Knowledge diffusion
1. Introduction
Basic inventions have broad technological applications and are the founda-
tions of many subsequent focused inventions whose applications are confined to
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narrow fields (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Studies about shifts in the rate of creation
of the former type of inventions concurring with the emergence of the academic
enterprise have led to a debate about a shift in the nature of academic research
(Larsen, 2011).
Henderson et al. (1998) claim that the basicness of university patents seems
to be declining with the emergence of the academic enterprise. Based on the
observation that recombination distance (the breath of technological integration)
is linked to invention basicness (Trajtenberg et al., 1997), the authors conclude
that this change in the quality of academic patents could imply a change in the
nature of academic research.
A reply to this study comes from Mowery and Ziedonis (2002) who claim that
the observed decline can mostly be attributed to entry by inexperienced univer-
sities and that learning effects can improve the importance of patents produced
by the latter (Mowery et al., 2002). Mowery and Sampat (2005) further stress
that university-industry technology transfer has been mostly successful in science-
based industries such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. These observations
possibly imply that differences in organizational capabilities and industry charac-
teristics can moderate the relationship between recombination distance and inven-
tion basicness.
On the subject of organizational capabilities, Banerjee and Cole (2010) show
that firm entry into new application domains by a sample of biotechnology en-
trepreneurial firms has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between
recombination distance and basicness. Is it then possible that the sector of activity
from which an invention originates could also moderate the relationship between
recombination distance and basicness? Do other factors related to the university-
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industry interface, such as industry characteristics and science-linkage strength of
an invention, have similar moderating effects?
To answer the above questions, we will perform an econometric analysis by
using a sample of Canadian nanotechnology patents registered in the US. This
emerging multidisciplinary field can potentially breed “general purpose technolo-
gies” (Youtie et al., 2008; Gómez-Baquero, 2009; Shea et al., 2011) and offers the
possibility to study the above-mentioned factors. We measure a patent’s recombi-
nation distance and invention basicness by constructing a Herfindahl-based index
of the diversity of technological classes from its backward and forward citations
respectively (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). By mean of regression analysis, we mea-
sure the moderating effect that the sector of activity, strength of science linkage
and industry emergence have on the relationship between recombination distance
and invention basicness.
In line with findings of Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and Banerjee and Cole (2010),
our results show that recombination distance is indeed positively linked with in-
vention basicness. However, we also find that while private organizations are less
likely to produce basic inventions, an increase in recombination distance by them
increases invention basicness at a higher rate. Science-linkage strength has a neg-
ative moderating effect on distant recombination. Finally, our results show that an
increase in recombination distance increases invention basicness at a higher rate
in the fragmented science-based nanotechnology industry. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature lists our hypotheses;
section 3 provides a complete description of the methodology; section 4 presents
the results; and section 5 discusses the results and provides some conclusions.
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2. Literature Review and hypotheses
2.1. Measuring innovative activity through patenting
From a legal point of view, patents confer monopolistic power with regards to
the use, production and commercialization of an invention in exchange of its dis-
closure. Since patents are granted to inventions that are novel, non-obvious and
useful, they can generally be viewed as indicators of technological change and
innovative activity (Basberg, 1987; Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Griliches, 1990;
Archibugi and Pianta, 1996). Various studies, however, point out that the majority
of patents have little economic value (Allison et al., 2004; Moore, 2005). Patent-
ing can sometimes be compared to gambling where firms bet on slots (Lemley and
Shapiro, 2005). Also, as Pénin (2005) points out, patents can be used as strategic
devices and, consequently, cannot be used in a straightforward manner to mea-
sure innovation. Nevertheless, some patent quality indicators are known to be
associated with commercial success: patent citations can be linked to firm value
(Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al., 2005) and patents deposed in the US by foreigners
have a higher expected value (Bessen, 2008).
Forward citations can be used in various ways to measure patent quality (Squic-
ciarini et al., 2013). One method supposes that important inventions are those that
are subsequently used by a great number of inventions. This method typically con-
sists in counting forward citations of a patent to measure its importance (Fleming,
2001; Sapsalis et al., 2006). Another method considers how the eventual use of an
invention spreads over technological classes (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Henderson
et al., 1998; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002), hence relying on the classification of
a patent’s forward citations in order to measure invention quality. Patents that are
subsequently cited in different technological classes are believed to be more ba-
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sic. Both basicness and forward citation counts have been associated with patent
value (Bessen, 2008; Serrano, 2010; Sreekumaran Nair et al., 2011; Fischer and
Leidinger, 2014). Nonetheless, metrics using forward citations can also be viewed
as indicators of invention social value (Baron and Delcamp, 2012).
A few precisions are in order regarding patent citations. First, one should note
that while applicants have the obligation to cite all related sources of knowledge,
they are not legally obliged to perform prior art search. In fact, it is incumbent
upon USPTO examiners to make sure that all appropriate sources are cited. Be-
cause patents constitute legal documents, examiners go through a thorough search
process in which they attempt to add all citations that are relevant to a patent (Tra-
jtenberg, 1990). Because a patent’s scope is defined by the novel features of an
invention, proper reference to prior art should be made in order to correctly define
the technological boundaries legally protected by the patent (Merges and Nelson,
1990). This renders the examination process essential to the preservation of patent
scope legal validity.
Based on these premises, Jaffe et al. (1993) argue that patent citations repre-
sent knowledge spillovers generated by patents. This assumption has been, to a
certain degree, brought into question for two reasons. On the one hand, because
citations restrict the patent’s scope, applicants often choose not to perform prior art
search, and when they do, they can cite other patents strategically (Sampat, 2010).
On the other hand, variations among patent examiners have been found imply-
ing that some patents could contain citations that are more accurate than others
(Cockburn et al., 2002; Alcácer and Gittelman, 2006). Also, time constraints can
lead examiners to add citations that are only remotely linked to the applied patent
in order to make sure that nothing has been missed out (Meyer, 2000). There are
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reasons, nevertheless, to believe that patent citations contain relevant information
that can have analytical value.
A number of studies argue that applicants have more incentives to search for
prior art for discrete technologies such as pharmaceuticals or chemicals while the
opposite hold for complex technologies such as electronics or telecommunica-
tion (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Sampat, 2010; Alcácer et al., 2009). Hegde and
Sampat (2009) further show that examiner added citations are better predictors
of patent renewal than applicant added citations. In addition, examiner citations
are more likely to be added when there is technological and geographical distance
between citing and cited patent (Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008). It is also worth-
while to note that examiners add a larger share of self-citations than the inventors
themselves (Sampat, 2010; Alcácer et al., 2009). Based on these considerations,
patent examination can also be viewed as a smoothing process that can sometimes
close citation gaps between related inventions (Azagra-Caro et al., 2011). USPTO
citations are indeed generally viewed as thorough in terms of containing links to
relevant prior art (Meyer, 2000; Von Wartburg et al., 2005).
Examiner citations can also be interpreted from a social learning perspective
(Amin and Cohendet, 2004). Although the validity of using patent citations to
measure knowledge flows can be brought into question, it is undeniable that ap-
plicants must, to a certain degree, be aware of contemporary technological devel-
opments before engaging in R&D activities. Since learning can be viewed as a
social process and that technological development is path-dependent (Rosenberg,
1994), it is difficult to imagine that in knowledge intensive industries, inventors
can be totally unaware of current technological challenges and potential solutions,
and yet be successful in introducing novelties. Being part of the social process of
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learning, inventors who search for novel solutions are embedded to their commu-
nity of practice. Furthermore, the tacit dimension of knowledge spillovers implies
that they do not always leave traces in the form of citations and do not neces-
sarily require formal transfer of knowledge (Krugman, 1991). Since this embed-
ding is likely to encompass even inventors who are employed by competitors, an
applicant’s failure to cite a relevant prior art does not necessarily rule out tacit
knowledge about related technologies.
2.2. The emergence of academic enterprise
Viewed as providers and repositories of basic knowledge, universities have
historically taken part in R&D activities that have low levels of appropriability
and in which firms found little incentives to invest (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962).
Basic research undertaken by universities had tremendous spillovers to the in-
dustry (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Zucker and Darby, 1996; Narin et al., 1997;
Cohen et al., 2002). The recognition of this phenomenon has led some to consider
a greater integration of universities with commercial activities (Etzkowitz, 1998;
Jensen and Thursby, 2001), an idea that is not unanimously acclaimed by scholars
(Larsen, 2011; Philpott et al., 2011). A major source of debate is about a possible
shift of university research toward more applied sciences, leading to an eventual
gap in basic research which might not be filled by firms (Foray and Lissoni, 2010).
An important source of disagreement related to this debate is the concept that
public research is coordinated by a reputation-based reward system, and that it
is through this non-market mechanism that scientists endeavor risky exploratory
research (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996; David, 2004). Changing the
reward system might change the behavior of academia and impact scientific pro-
duction. Other mechanisms that foster university-industry technology transfer and
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which do not necessarily have to involve university patenting can be considered
(D’Este and Patel, 2007; Yusuf, 2008; Grimpe and Hussinger, 2013). In another
line of thought, it is claimed that research groups act as “quasi-firms” when they
perform their day-to-day routines (Etzkowitz, 2003). This idea reflects the as-
sumption that entrepreneurial universities can be successful in both performing
their duty of “searching for the truth” and transferring technologies to the market-
place (Etzkowitz, 1998). With the emergence of “markets for technology” (Arora
et al., 2001; Debackere and Veugelers, 2005), the idea that universities can ben-
efit commercially by supplying technologies to the industry can be reinforced by
empirical findings that do not see real differences in the value distribution of aca-
demic and industry patents (Sapsalis et al., 2006).
2.3. Search heuristics, capabilities and the self-organization of inventive activity
From the perspective of evolutionary economics, inventing can be viewed as
the act of combining exiting resources in new ways (Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson
and Winter, 1982). Recombination is the result of a “search” process aimed at
identifying and selecting useful components to solve problems in a “satisficing”
manner (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). This selection process
can be analogous to the evolution of biological species, except it is not blind but
rather purposeful in nature (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
When searching for existing components, agents can resort to a dichotomous
set of heuristics: they can either exploit known technological paths or explore new
ones (March, 1991). Knowledge exploitation leads to local recombination, i.e. the
integration of components situated in the immediate periphery of dominant rou-
tines. This option involves the improvement of current procedures and an ever
increasing specialization of the firm in a few fields of expertise. Knowledge ex-
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ploration in contrast involves searching or experimenting in ways that break away
from dominant routines. It requires learning radically different ways of solving
problems and leads to distant recombination (Gruber et al., 2013).
Empirical findings generally associate the dichotomous nature of these search
heuristics to a dichotomy in their outcomes. In line with the idea that distant
recombination will yield basic inventions (Trajtenberg et al., 1997), Rosenkopf
and Nerkar (2001) show that searching beyond the boundaries of the optical disk
industry is more likely to lead to an invention that will be used in other industries.
Datta and Jessup (2013) also show that searching outside an industry leads to
the development of more radical inventions. Fleming (2001) argues that local
recombination contributes to the creation of incremental innovations while distant
recombination, although leading to many failures, is more likely to lead to radical
innovations. Similarly, Kim et al. (2012) find that exploitative search is positively
linked with invention rates but negatively with impact, while exploratory search
exhibits the opposite relationships.
Exclusive reliance on one heuristic can be detrimental to organizational ca-
pabilities. Although local recombination allows easier absorption of knowledge
and lower levels of uncertainty, firms that over-exploit existing routines can be
stuck in a competency trap where they cannot effectively adapt to an environment
dominated by the widespread diffusion of components that are distant from the
ones with which they are familiar (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March,
1993). According to Tushman and O’Reilly III (1996)’s ambidexterity perspec-
tive, exploitation increases organizational efficiency and is beneficial in times of
environmental stability, while exploration increases organizational flexibility and
is beneficial in times of environmental fluctuation. From this perspective, explo-
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ration increases a firm’s “absorptive capacity” (ability to learn from its environ-
ment) and thus to adapt to changing environments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989,
1990; Raisch et al., 2009).
The aggregate effort of opportunity seeking agents having heterogeneous ca-
pabilities can be viewed as a complex adaptive system (Silverberg et al., 1988;
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). In this perspective, inventors evolve in a commu-
nity which is constantly recombining existing technologies to create new ones.
This collective effort results in a complex network of interlinked technological
components. In this setting, the search process is partly simplified by the presence
of “technological trajectories” which act as “cognitive outposts” shared collec-
tively and direct search effort toward certain paths (Dosi, 1982). “Bounded ra-
tionality”, however, implies that search is performed without a priori knowledge
of its outcome. Even if technological trajectories act as guideposts for search,
neither opportunities nor the ways to grasp them are entirely known in advance
(Cyert and March, 1963; Dosi, 1988). The diffusion of inventions reflects the het-
erogeneous learning capabilities of, and the search heuristics employed by, the
collection of agents (Dosi, 1988; Geroski, 2000). What is adopted, and deemed
useful, is what falls within search. Given that there is always an upper bound
on agents’ absorptive capacity, the adoption of potentially useful inventions is not
warranted.
2.4. Inter-institutional heterogeneity and the public-private dichotomy
If heterogeneous capabilities at intra-institutional level can explain differences
in the quality of academic patents (Mowery et al., 2002; Czarnitzki et al., 2011;
Acosta et al., 2012), then the same principle can be applied to expect similar
observation at inter-institutional level, i.e. between the private and the public
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sector.
Institutional proximity between inventive agents can influence the knowledge
diffusion process (Cantwell, 2000; Boschma, 2005; D’Amore et al., 2013). This
perspective would suggest that organizations are more likely to recombine tech-
nologies produced by organizations that are bound to the same rules and norms.
Inter-institutional heterogeneity can be rooted in the normative rules and reward
systems to which private and public sector are respectively subjected (Dasgupta
and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996; Tartari and Breschi, 2012; Bodas Freitas and Nu-
volari, 2012; Veer and Jell, 2012; Ankrah et al., 2013). Faced with short-term im-
peratives, firms often have the reflex of exploiting already possessed skills (Tush-
man and O’Reilly III, 1996; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Fang et al., 2010). Such
imperatives are not imposed on public organizations that do not abide to market
norms. While this reality can have an impact on the respective capabilities of pri-
vate and public sector organizations to perform basic research (Trajtenberg et al.,
1997), it can also have an impact on how easily inventions produced by the public
sector pervade across institutional boundaries and be adopted in the private sector.
In other words, institutional proximity between actors in the private sector
directs technological development towards trajectory commonly adhered by ac-
tors in that sector. The more complex is an invention, and thus its absorption
difficult, the more difficult becomes inter-institutional transfer (Petruzzelli, 2011;
Czarnitzki et al., 2012; Woerter, 2012; Muscio and Pozzali, 2013). In a techno-
logical landscape where most patents are owned by the private sector, the picture
could appear grim for the diffusion of complex inventions resulting from public
sector research. Popular views about the embryonic nature of university inven-
tions, whether true or not (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Colyvas et al., 2002), could
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create a bias which would advantage the diffusion of private sector inventions that
result from distant recombination.
Another source of inter-institutional heterogeneity can be traced in the respec-
tive complementary assets (Teece, 1986) owned by the private and the public
sector. Here, one major difference is that patent licensing consists in the main
channel for technology commercialization that public organizations dispose of
(Shane, 2004b). Even though spinoffs can theoretically be created around uni-
versity technologies, they represent a small percentage of invention disclosures
(Shane, 2004a). In other words, strategic options for public organizations are lim-
ited to the markets for technologies.
While it is true that markets for technology offer new strategic possibilities,
their presence alone does not guarantee the diffusion of technologies. While com-
plementary assets are not required for entering the markets for technology, it does
not mean that they are not useful for proper screening and sensing of technological
opportunities (Day, 1994; Teece, 1998, 2007).
Here, a relevant feature of complementary assets could be noted in R&D and
marketing integration (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Leenders and Wierenga, 2002;
Verhoef and Leeflang, 2009). Given that R&D andmarketing integration activities
can be seen as central components to foresight and sensing (Day, 1994), this factor
can also contribute to different outcomes with regards to distant recombination.
Indeed, such capabilities can embed market knowledge during the search process
and allow for recombinations that will land on the right outposts of technological
trajectories. Regarding R&D and marketing integration, it is difficult to claim that
public sector organizations have the same kind of capabilities than those in the
private sector. This function cannot be fulfilled by the technology transfer office
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which comes into play only after the invention is created (Kenney and Patton,
2009; Landry et al., 2013). Faculty involvement in technology transfer through
royalty or equity (Jensen and Thursby, 2001) will not solve this issue either.
In sum, given that the private sector produces most of the patents and that
it is more likely to source itself within its own institutional boundaries when in-
ventions are complex, and that complementary assets possessed by private sector
organizations help the latter in identifying major trajectory outposts, we hypothe-
size that:
Hypothesis H1. Increases in recombination distance by the private sector
leads to higher increases in invention basicness.
2.5. Cognitive distance and science linkage strength
According to Nooteboom et al. (2007), too much cognitive distance between
knowledge owned and explored is detrimental to its transfer. Distant recombina-
tion requires a broader absorptive capacity from both the agent that performs it
and those that eventually adopt it. The difficulty encountered by firms in absorb-
ing external knowledge can explain why many inventions resulting from distant
recombination end-up being failures (Nemet and Johnson, 2012). Also, firm ab-
sorptive capacity, which is linked to preferred search heuristics, can impact its
ability to license distant technologies (Laursen et al., 2010).
Proximity to basic sciences leads to the creation of innovations that have broad
applications. However, beside the risk associated to the many failures that it can
cause (Kim et al., 2012), knowledge that is close to basic research is more difficult
to absorb outside the academic environment, that is a locus where access to basic
science is the strongest (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nooteboom et al., 2007).
This observation hints at the direction that inventions that have strong linkage with
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basic sciences will not always succeed in finding adoption. Being strongly linked
to basic science can thus be an inhibitor when it comes to invention diffusion.
Incidentally, if new technologies that are close to basic science result from
distant recombination, it could be that they have too much cognitive distance
from what can be promptly absorbed in the industry. There could be a case of
knowledge that is “too theoretical” to be easily absorbed (Gilsing et al., 2011).
Given that firms operate under conditions of time constraint in which they tend to
prefer short-term solutions to current problems (Lynn et al., 1996; Tushman and
O’Reilly III, 1996), such cognitively different inventions can be overlooked or too
difficult to incorporate within search. In other words, such inventions could po-
tentially have a very broad impact, but they could also be too innovative to satisfy
immediate needs (McGrath, 2001; Lo et al., 2012). We thus hypothesize that:
Hypothesis H2. The interaction between the strength of linkage to basic sci-
ences and recombination distance is negatively associated with invention basic-
ness.
2.6. Industry characteristics and preferred search heuristics
From an industry evolution perspective, preferred search heuristics can evolve
as industries evolve from periods of radical change to periods of incremental im-
provements (Dosi, 1982; Tushman andAnderson, 1986; Abernathy and Utterback,
1978). Industry birth is generally initiated with the occurrence of “competence-
destroying discontinuities” (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). These breakthroughs
can result from the confluence of existing technologies and threaten the techno-
logical dominance of incumbent firms (Maine et al., 2014). In the early days of an
industry, most research effort is spent on positioning against a “dominant design”
built around the technological breakthrough (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; An-
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derson and Tushman, 1990). This stage is marked by great turbulence as new
entrants will explore and recombine distant technological components to find so-
lutions that will become the dominant design. Once a dominant design is adopted,
technological development becomes focused and cumulative as components are
improved over time (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Anderson and Tushman,
1990). As a result, a concentration of inventive activity can be seen along trends
toward more incremental improvements (Utterback and Suárez, 1993).
Breakthroughs that have competence-destroying potential do not always dis-
place incumbents. In fact, Tripsas (1997) argues that the latter can leverage their
dynamic capabilities and complementary assets to withstand newcomer attacks.
In such cases, discontinuities can be “competence-enhancing” and thus reinforce
incumbent position (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). When the discontinuity is
dependent upon complementary assets owned by the incumbent, or when the lat-
ter has the ability to adapt to the discontinuity, the expected turbulent period of
technological exploration by new entrants does not occur. As a result, inventive
effort can continue to be focused and cumulative in nature.
Sectoral patterns can also dictate the type of research heuristics that will ap-
pear to be attractive. Literature reporting successful university-industry technol-
ogy transfer in science-based industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceu-
ticals is aplenty (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Etzkowitz, 1998; Zucker et al., 2002;
Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Mowery and Sam-
pat, 2005; Nikulainen and Palmberg, 2010; Gilsing et al., 2011; Lissoni, 2012). In
development-based industries, however, there is a higher dependency on nonaca-
demic research (Gilsing et al., 2011). In these fields, the bulk of inventive activity
consists in incremental advances that were almost exclusively the domain of in-
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dustrial R&D (Mowery and Sampat, 2005). One could thus argue that there is
a fit between university capabilities in performing basic and exploratory research
and the needs of firms in science-based industries. We thus expect the relationship
between recombination distance and invention basicness to be positively moder-
ated by industry fragmentation and science-based nature of inventive activity and
propose our last hypothesis:
Hypothesis H3. Increases in recombination distance in fragmented science-
based industries leads to higher increases in invention basicness.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
We analyze a sample of patents from the Canadian nanotechnology industry
registered in the US. Nanotechnology is an emerging and multidisciplinary field,
which makes a great locus for novel creations. The US represent the largest global
market and are the most important economic partner for Canada. Li et al. (2007)
show that the US is the first foreign destination in which Canadian firms file for
patents. Barirani et al. (2013) offer a lexical query for the extraction and clustering
of technologically similar “Canadian-made” nanotechnology patents. The study
identifies three broad fields of expertise in Canada: nanobiotechnology, display
technologies and optics. Because the method employed by the study only takes
into account patents connected to the main network component, the whole set of
patents that are extracted from the lexical query are not classified. We use the
title and abstracts from the main network component’s classified patents to train
a K-NN model that would subsequently classify the non-connected patents into
the three fields of expertise. We then select patents that were granted from 1990
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to 1997 for which we extract information regarding their grant date, inventors,
number of claims, and forward citations until year 2009. Patents for which no
assignees are specified, as well as those that were co-assigned to public and private
organizations (the latter case only includes three patents) were removed. The final
sample contains 848 patents.
3.2. Dependent variable
Given a patent with n forward citations falling into m 3-digit classes, Trajten-
berg et al. (1997) measure the degree with which future use of a patent spans
technological classes with the following equation:
BAS ICNES S = 1 −
m∑
i=1
(
CLAS S i
n
)2
(1)
Where CLAS S i is the number of the patent’s forward citations that fall within
class i. As this value gets closer to zero, future inventions are limited in a narrow
set of technological areas (which we call focused inventions), and a value closer
to one indicates a more basic invention which is used in numerous technological
areas.
To compute this value, we use patents’ forward citations for a 12-year period
after the grant year. This is justified by the fact that technological breakthroughs
enjoy a rather slower adoption rate due to their inherent complexity (Schoenmak-
ers and Duysters, 2010). Furthermore, patents that receive citations for a longer
period are more likely to be important patents since high rates of technological ob-
solescence in high-technology industries means that lower quality patents could
stop receiving citations earlier in their lifetime.
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3.3. Independent variables
Given a patent with p backward citations falling into q 3-digit classes, the
degree with which a patent combines technologies from distant classes can be
computed with the following equation:
DIS T ANCE = 1 −
q∑
i=1
(
CLAS S i
p
)2
(2)
This variable measures the distance between technological components that
were recombined to create an invention. As this value gets closer to zero, we are
dealing with local recombination, and as it gets closer to one, we are dealing with
distant recombination.
Prior studies indicate that within the three major areas of expertise, nanobiotech-
nology (encompassing nanotechnology-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology
applications) is a science-based industry with low levels of concentration of patents
in few firms (Barirani et al., 2013). Indeed, public institutions play a central role
in the patent co-citation network. Similar patterns were found in the initial days
of the biotechnology industry (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). The other dis-
ciplines are dominated by a smaller number of players and thus exhibit concen-
tration although, given their activities in the nanotechnology industry, these in-
dustries are obviously very knowledge intensive. The main difference between
nanobiotechnology and the other industries (optics and display technologies) is
that it can answer to needs that could not be answered previously (such as ap-
plications of drug delivery allow for new types of treatment that are not possible
without the application of nanoscale technologies), whereas the others are merely
using new technology to answer existing needs. In these industries, one can as-
sume that incumbents were able to adapt nanotechnology components and that
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many of the complementary assets owned by them have kept their value. Thus,
to distinguish between emerging and mature industries, we will add the dummy
variable NANOBIO using the patent classification process described earlier.
We account for the sector of activity (private or public) using information on
patent assignees. Patents are classified based on whether they are owned by cor-
porations or public organizations, the latter including universities. We employ the
dummy variable PRIVATE to identify corporations.
We use the number of non-patent references (NPRS) as a proxy for the strength
of the linkage between a patent and basic science. Callaert et al. (2006) find
that most NPRS are references to scientific journals, and that a greater share of
NPRS are made to scientific journals in knowledge intensive industries. Given
the emerging nature of the nanotechnology industry, we thus believe that it is
reasonable to use the number of non-patent references to measure proximity to
basic science.
3.4. Control and dummy variables
The variable DISTANCE is dependent upon the number of backward citations
that a patent contains. In other words, the higher is the number of backward
citations, the higher is the probability that all of them are not assigned to one class.
To account for this, we propose to control the degree of distant recombination by
the patent’ total number of backward-citations (NCITBACK). Similarity, variable
BASICNESS can be influenced by the number of forward citations. We thus add
control variable NFORWCIT to our model which is a measure of the number of
forward citations for a 12-year period after the patent’s grant year.
The scope of a patent’s claims determines the monopoly power of the patent
holder by defining the main novel features of the invention (Merges and Nelson,
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1990). Inventors have an incentive to claim as much as possible while patent ex-
aminers must narrow down the scope of the patent before granting it (Lanjouw
and Schankerman, 2004). The number of claims can therefore be used as an indi-
cation of a patent’s quality (Tong and Frame, 1994). Patents that claim more are
thus more likely to restrict the scope of other patents which also translates into
being cited by those restricted patents. This in turn can have an impact on the dif-
fusion pattern of a patent. We thus employ the variable CLAIMS which counts the
number of claims a patent makes to control for its impact on basicness. Technol-
ogy classes in which a patent falls can also be used to measure its scope (Lerner,
1994). We use the variable SCOPE to measure the number of distinct 3-digit US
classes to which each patent is assigned. The addition of this variable also controls
for the fact that examiner citations are closely linked to the technological classes
in which patents fall (Lerner, 1994). In other words, inventions that fall in numer-
ous classes will have a higher likelihood of citing (and eventually being cited by)
patents from various classes. SCOPE will thus control the part of an invention’s
basicness that is due to the classification performed by USPTO examiners.
Organizational experience in patenting can also have an impact on diffusion
outcome. This is especially true for universities whose accumulated experience
in patenting and technology transfer can have a positive impact on the adoption
of their inventions on the marketplace (Thursby and Thursby, 2007). We control
for experience in patenting in two ways. First by measuring the total number of
nanotechnology patents that a patent holder obtains between the 1990-1997 pe-
riod. We report this variable as NBPATS. It should be noted that the number of
patents obtained by the same firms in various periods (ex: between 1980-1989
and 1990-1997) is strongly correlated for the organizations in our sample (greater
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than 0.75). Second, we compute a 5-year moving sum representing all the patents
owned by an assignee 5 years prior to the obtainment of a new patent. This vari-
able is reported as EXPERIENCE.
Since many advantages can be associated with being part of a patent’s invent-
ing team, it is natural to assume that only those who bring distinctive skills to the
table will have the power to earn a place among the list of inventors. For instance,
if an invention results from the work of a team composed of one senior-level re-
searcher or engineer and a few junior-level engineers who play a less critical role
in the development of the invention, it is more likely that only the senior-level
member will end up as the sole inventor. In contrast, if a complex invention re-
quires the involvement of many senior-level researchers and scientists who each
come with their own special skills, then chances are that they will have to come
to an agreement to include all of them in the list of inventors. Since it is not likely
that one individual has enough expertise to cover a broad range of technologies,
we are expecting to see that teams composed of a greater number of inventors
should cover different technological areas. We thus control for team size through
variable TEAMSIZE, which measures the number of investors listed in a patent.
Time can have various effects on patent metrics. For instance, technological
progress goes through different stages, which can be visible over time, and poli-
cies can have an impact on patenting activity. Numerous studies therefore use the
patent’s grant date to control for various factors that may affect dependent vari-
ables (Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2010; Nemet and Johnson, 2012). We also use
the patent grant year to account for unmeasured time effects. This is represented
by year dummy variables Y1991 to Y1997.
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3.5. Interaction variables
To measure the moderating impact of the type of activity (private-public di-
chotomy), science linkage and industry emergence, three interaction variables will
be considered in this study. The interaction between DISTANCE and PRIVATE
will show how distant recombination performed by firms results in basic inven-
tions, compared to the public research institutions. The interaction between DIS-
TANCE and NPRS will show how the strength of science linkage will lead to more
basic inventions. Given that these two variables are continuous, a positive coeffi-
cient will indicate that distant recombination and science-linkage have impact in
the same direction, while a negative coefficient will indicate that the two variables
work in opposite directions. The interaction between DISTANCE and NANOBIO
will indicate whether distant recombination in the emerging nanobiotechnology
industry leads to more basic inventions, compared to the two other technologies
(optics and display).
3.6. Models
In attempting to link distant recombination with invention basicness, our method-
ology mainly consists in analyzing the statistical relationship between the spread
of a patent’s backward-citations with that of its forward-citations. We therefore
associate recombination distance with the use of inventions from a multitude of
disciplines during research and its basicness with its use by subsequent inventions
in a multitude of disciplines. Because we also try to measure the impact of institu-
tional differences (H1), science-linkage strength (H2) and industry characteristics
(H3), we perform a hierarchical analysis that will measure the moderating effect of
these factors over the relationship between recombination distance and invention
basicness.
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Because our dependent variable is continuous, our main statistical method will
use ordinary least squares (OLS). Since many patents will fall within the definition
of focused inventions and will have a value of zero, we use the left censored Tobit
model to test the robustness of our OLS model. Furthermore, for each model,
robust variance estimates are computed through “clustered sandwich estimator”
method (Rogers, 1987) using patent assignee names as cluster authenticators. This
is justified by the fact that organizational practices in patenting can have an impact
on diffusion outcome. For large patent holders, there can be correlation among
observations (patents) given the cumulative nature of technology development for
these organizations.
4. Analysis and Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for all variables (except YEAR dummies).
One can see a positive relationship between DISTANCE and BASICNESS, which
goes in the direction of our first hypothesis. It is also worth discussing the rela-
tionship between variables NPRS, PRIVATE and NANOBIO. These results corrob-
orate findings about the nature of activities in the biotechnology industry (Barirani
et al., 2013), compared to the other two industries. Indeed, we can see that pub-
lic institutions are more present in the nanobiotechnology industry. Furthermore,
organizations in this industry appear to have stronger links with basic sciences.
Some other finding can be corroborated by our data. For instance, PRIVATE is
negatively correlated with NPRS as it is often observed (Dasgupta and David,
1994; Stephan, 1996; Trajtenberg et al., 1997).
One can notice a strong correlation between DISTANCE and NCITBACK (and
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with SCOPE to a smaller extent), and thus the possibility of multicollinearity. One
should note that these variables are naturally confounded given the correlation be-
tween examiner classifying patents in multiple classes and citing (many) patents
from multiple classes. Nonetheless, the regression results shown in the following
sections are robust with regards to this degree of correlation. For instance, re-
moving variable NCITBACK (these estimations are, however, not reported here)
from models 2 to 6 in tables 2 and A.4 yields very similar results. It thus ap-
pears that the variable DISTANCE contains information that encompasses that of
NCITBACK. Also, measuring variance inflator factor (VIF) for models 1 and 2 in
table 2 both give a value of 1.86 and 1.73 respectively, which is below generally
recommended maximum value (Neter et al., 1985; Hair et al., 2009). Models 3
to 6, which include interaction variables, are also below the rule-of-thumb thresh-
old. Our view is that although our data exhibits some level of multicollinearity
between certain variables, enough information is contained in each of them to
allow for discrimination between observations.
4.2. Inferential statistics
Tables 2 to A.5 present our results for the OLS and Tobit models. Because
estimates for these models are very similar, we will refer to the results from the
OLS models using NBPAT in the following discussion. Model 1 shows that the
link between the number of forward citations and patent basicness is significant.
As expected, we find a positive relationship between SCOPE and BASICNESS.
Similarly, the total number of backward citations has a positive relationship with
BASICNESS.
Model 2 takes into account the independent variables to our experiment and
is an improvement over model 1: adding recombination distance to the model
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improves its explanatory power. We find a negative and significant relationship
between PRIVATE and basicness. This observation corroborates the findings that
firms produce a smaller share of basic inventions. The model also shows a signifi-
cant relationship between DISTANCE and basicness, but interestingly, the impact
from the number of backward citations (NCITBACK) on invention basicness is no
longer significant when we control for distant recombination. It appears that, all
things being equal, patents that result from the combination of technologies from
different fields will turn out to be eventually used in a multitude of disciplines.
These findings are in line with Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and Banerjee and Cole
(2010).
Model 6 incorporates interaction effects with DISTANCE (models 3 to 5 in-
corporate interactions one-by-one for robustness checking). As we can see, the
interaction between DISTANCE and PRIVATE results into a significant and pos-
itive relationship with basicness. It thus appears that whether the patent holder
is a private or public organization has an impact on the degree with which inven-
tions diffuse across disciplines as recombination distance increases. Given that
PRIVATE is negatively associated with BASICNESS, this implies that public orga-
nizations produce higher rates of basic inventions at lower values recombination
distance and that this difference between private and public sector dissipates as
recombination distance increases. This finding supports H1 that while the rela-
tionship between recombination distance and invention basicness is still positive
for public organizations, an increase of one unit in recombination distance can be
linked to a greater increase in invention basicness in the private sector. As we can
see in figure 1a, distant recombination by the private sector eventually surpasses
the public sector (in terms of associated patent basicness), but this is the case for
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Table 2: Results - OLS regressions using NBPAT.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NCITFORW 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
NCITBACK 0.0028∗ -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018)
SCOPE 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0239∗∗ 0.0260∗∗ 0.0252∗∗ 0.0115 0.0246∗∗ 0.0102
(0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0100) (0.0123) (0.0108)
CLAIMS 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0006 0.0011
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
TEAMSIZE -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0006 0.0078 -0.0018 0.0062
(0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0067) (0.0051) (0.0067)
NBPAT -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0010
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0024)
GRANTYEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
DISTANCE 0.2599∗∗∗∗ 0.1655∗∗∗∗ 0.2855∗∗∗∗ 0.2351∗∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗ 0.1270∗∗ 0.1368∗∗ 0.1203∗
(0.0291) (0.0465) (0.0325) (0.0347) (0.0602) (0.0629) (0.0603) (0.0640)
NPRS -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0015∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0015∗ 0.0014∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
PRIVATE -0.0760∗∗ -0.1191∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗ -0.0755∗∗ -0.1187∗∗∗ -0.1118∗∗∗ -0.1153∗∗∗ -0.1096∗∗∗
(0.0294) (0.0387) (0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0396) (0.0405) (0.0397) (0.0415)
NANOBIO -0.0144 -0.0139 -0.0143 -0.0385 -0.0667∗ -0.0972∗∗∗ -0.0724∗ -0.1000∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0372) (0.0362) (0.0347) (0.0388) (0.0367)
DISTANCExPRIVATE 0.1202∗∗ 0.1229∗∗ 0.1164∗ 0.1242∗∗ 0.1154∗
(0.0527) (0.0584) (0.0603) (0.0584) (0.0624)
DISTANCExNPR -0.0041∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0048∗∗ -0.0051∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019)
DISTANCExNANOBIO 0.0647 0.1420∗∗ 0.1773∗∗∗ 0.1431∗∗ 0.1809∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0628) (0.0668) (0.0653) (0.0732)
Constant 0.2658∗∗∗∗ 0.2812∗∗∗∗ 0.3160∗∗∗∗ 0.2662∗∗∗∗ 0.2903∗∗∗∗ 0.3183∗∗∗∗ 0.3336∗∗∗∗ 0.3347∗∗∗∗ 0.3449∗∗∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0493) (0.0537) (0.0492) (0.0498) (0.0561) (0.0632) (0.0555) (0.0612)
Observations 848 848 848 848 848 848 583 797 532
Clusters 284 284 284 284 284 284 283 283 282
Log lik. -38.4170 -3.3836 -2.0512 -1.4403 -2.8240 1.6292 15.1335 -4.3385 8.2481
F 17.6193 32.9509 30.1708 34.2517 32.5005 32.6476 12.9682 31.5472 9.0664
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.1478 0.2154 0.2178 0.2190 0.2164 0.2246 0.2219 0.2323 0.2282
Adjusted R-squared 0.1345 0.1993 0.2009 0.2020 0.1994 0.2059 0.1943 0.2125 0.1979
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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very large values. One should note that our sample does not contain such large
values of DISTANCE.
As expected, we observe a negative and significant relationship between BA-
SICNESS and the interaction of DISTANCE and NPRS. It thus appears that com-
bining distant technologies and depending heavily on basic science have a nega-
tive impact on the patent’s diffusion over multiple disciplines. Again, this interac-
tion effect does not mean that the resulting invention will be useless. However, it
implies that such inventions do not succeed in reaching the broad adoption that one
expects the results of combining basic knowledge should have. It should be noted
that there is a positive significant relationship between NPRS and BASICNESS for
models 4 and 6 where NPRS interact with DISTANCE. In other models where
the interaction between NPRS and DISTANCE is not included, the relationship
between NPRS and BASICNESS is negative although not significant. Our inter-
pretation of this phenomenon is that observations for which NPRS and DISTANCE
are both high appear to drag down the coefficient of NPRS when interaction effects
are not taken into account. Our take is that exploratory research (either through
strong scientific linkage or distant technological recombination) can be generally
linked with inventions basicness, but that interaction between different modes of
exploration can lead to difficult absorption and thus decreased observed basicness.
These findings support H2 in that the exploratory search involving distant techno-
logical recombination and strong linkage with basic sciences is negatively related
to invention basicness.
We find a positive and significant relationship between basicness and the inter-
action of DISTANCE with NANOBIO. One should however notice that this feature
of the industry is not apparent when we do not control for other interactions (as
28
DISTANCE
B
A
S
IC
N
E
S
S
0.99
0.48
(a) Model 3
DISTANCE
B
A
S
IC
N
E
S
S
0.97
0.45
(b) Model 6
DISTANCE
B
A
S
IC
N
E
S
S
0.96
0.46
(c) Model 7
DISTANCE
B
A
S
IC
N
E
S
S
0.93
0.46
(d) Model 8
DISTANCE
B
A
S
IC
N
E
S
S
0.95
0.46
(e) Model 9
Figure 1: Regression lines for models 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 from table 2 (using NBPAT). Solid and
dashed lines represent regression lines for the public and the private sector respectively. Dotted
lines represent the value of DISTANCE at which the private sector produces basic inventions at
a higher rate. Both DISTANCE and BASICNESS are in the interval [0, 1[. Note that the highest
value of DISTANCE in our sample is 0.8984.
29
in model 5). In fact, science linkage and inventive activity by public institutions
is stronger in nanobiotechnology than other industries. Thus, the effect of these
various forces (measured through NPRS and PRIVATE) impact the interaction of
DISTANCE with NANOBIO. When controlling for these factors (in model 6), we
see that distant recombination in nanobiotechnology, an emerging science-based
industry, results in inventions that will have spread over various disciplines. These
findings support H3.
Finally, given the skewed distribution of patents among organizations (a few
organizations own many patents, while many organizations own a few patents), it
is relevant to test whether the presence of large private patent holders introduces
a bias in our results. We have run model 6 on separate samples removing the two
largest patents holders: Xerox Corporation (with 265 patents) and Nortel Net-
works (with 51 patents). Model 7 removes Xerox Corporation, model 8 removes
Nortel Networks and model 9 removes both firms. As we can see, results are sen-
sibly the same as those reported above. We can say that the results are robust to
the exclusion of the two largest patent holders, Xerox and Nortel.
5. Discussion and conclusion
There is little consensus among scholars regarding the benefits of the academic
enterprise model. One camp claims that universities can leverage markets for
technology and use patenting as a way to finance their operations. The other
camp claims that changing the reward and incentive system can have a negative
impact on the type of research endeavored in universities. A large part of this
debate has taken place around the presumption that distant recombination is linked
to invention basicness, rendering possible the ability to take conclusions about a
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shift in the nature of research conducted within universities by examining shifts
to the basicness of the patents they are granted. We argue that these assumptions
do not fully take into consideration moderating factors that come into play.
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the relationship between recombi-
nation distance and invention basicness can be moderated by institutional differ-
ences, science-linkage strength and industry characteristics. We have conducted
an econometric analysis by employing a sample of Canadian-invented nanotech-
nology patents granted between 1990 and 1997. Our results show that the above
factors can indeed have moderating effects.
An interesting finding in our study is the ability of private organizations to
transform the results of distant recombination into inventions that become basic
in the future. This is despite the fact that public institutions are, overall, producing
basic inventions at a higher rate. Therefore, while our results confirm other obser-
vations about a tendency of firms for short-term profits and exploitative activities
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996), there appears to
be more than meets the eye. Indeed, we find that firms can be more successful
than public organizations in producing basic inventions under the condition that
they engage in technological exploration. This finding also brings new insight
about the involvement of universities in commercial activities. More precisely,
even though universities could be better equipped in performing basic research,
it does not mean that such efforts will be effectively transmitted into inventions
that have a broad social impact. The skills for which universities are solicited
(performing explorative research) does not appear to be the one leading to the de-
sired effect of producing more socially useful inventions. In fact, it is when they
perform local recombination (that is the opposite of what they are supposed to
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be good at) that public organizations appear to be distinguished from firms. This
finding could appear counter intuitive in that, to the proponents of the academic
enterprise, it could mean that universities should be performing more local re-
combination, which would implicitly call for them doing less basic research. The
question would thus remain: who will do basic research if one does not expect
public institutions to have more resources to fill the gap left?
Another contribution of this article is concerned with the impact of basic sci-
ences on basic inventions. Proximity to basic science is often believed to be a
source of inspiration for breakthrough creation. However, if one takes the risks
associated with the failure of potential adopters to absorb novelties that are too
complex, then combining both strong science linkage with distant recombination
can have a detrimental effect on diffusion. In these cases, a new technology that
has great potential could have been developed, but could also fail to find subse-
quent users. Given that the combined impact of distant recombination and basic
science linkage move in opposite directions, our findings support the idea that in-
ventions which are strongly sourced in basic sciences should be focused in one
technological discipline to have maximum social impact. These findings are in
line with study by Kim et al. (2012) about the trade-offs of scientific exploration.
Finally, our results show that distant recombination does not equally produce
basic inventions in all domains. In the nanobiotechnology sector, where compe-
tition is high, distant recombination yields a greater amount of basic inventions.
This is, to a certain degree, due to fact that mature industries will concentrate on
focused inventions. In such fields, where a few players are dominant, inventions
are cumulative in nature. R&D effort will therefore be concentrated on incremen-
tal improvement around the dominant designs. Introducing radically novel ways
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of doing things in such industries will not translate into proper level of adoption.
This finding can be put in perspective with regards to ambidexterity (Tushman
and O’Reilly III, 1996). The balance between exploration and exploitation can be
dictated by industry development stage: when markets are turbulent, exploration
is more likely to produce basic inventions; but when they are stable, exploitation
is the type of activity that leads to basic inventions. This statement, however, does
not suggest that basic inventions have better prospects of private returns in mature
industries.
Looking at the whole picture, more can be said about the importance of uni-
versity inventions in science-based industries (Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Our
results seem to indicate that, when we control for sectoral effects (nanobiotech-
nology in this case) and science-linkage strength, the relationship between re-
combination distance and invention basicness is negatively moderated in the case
of public organizations. In other words, without having to dispute the idea that
university research has a much more important impact in science-based fields,
the relevance of university patenting as the best way to foster university-industry
technology transfer can still be questioned.
Our study brings under scrutiny the idea that markets for technology will un-
leash the revenue generating capacity of the academic enterprise. Unless one’s
view about successful technology transfer requires heroic efforts by faculty mem-
bers, research groups cannot be as efficient as firms in exploiting their ability to
perform exploratory research unless they are able to integrate marketing resources
for better sensing of technological opportunities. Further taking into account the
impact that inter-institutional differences can have on invention diffusion adds an-
other dimension to the problem. This perspective implies that even the ownership
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of complementary assets by universities (better patent office capabilities, more
successful spinoff generation, stronger industry ties) might not completely over-
come the institutional distance that impedes the transfer of complex technologies
to the private sector.
This paper does not intent to question the possibility that universities could be
able to appropriate returns on research that they endeavor. However, to the extent
where part of the trend in academic patenting is motivated by a replacement of de-
creasing public funds, our study suggests that it is worthwhile to further study the
efficiency of such trends especially when considering differences in capabilities
between private and public institutions. The fact that lack of funding pushes uni-
versities towards commercial avenues should be questioned instead of be treated
for granted. An interpretation of our study would be that favoring distant recombi-
nation within firms might be a better policy from a social point of view. This does
not rule out considering ways to foster university-industry technology transfer that
do not automatically call for more patenting or competitive behavior by public
sector organizations (D’Este and Patel, 2007; Yusuf, 2008). One should note that
our findings do not automatically imply that the production of basic patents by the
public sector is cost ineffective: institutional differences between the private and
the public sector could mean different cost functions to distant recombination that
would favor performing this kind of research in the public sector.
An inherent limit of our study is in the use of US classes to measure recombi-
nation distance and invention basicness. The problem arises from the fact that US
classes are not defined hierarchically. All three-digit US classes are at the same
level and do not contain information about proximity between classes. Thus, two
patents can have the same value for recombination distance but combine techno-
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logical classes that are at different distances. Our Herfindahl-based index mea-
suring recombination distance and invention basicness is bound between zero and
one and thus does not fully reflect the highly skewed distribution of invention
impact. Building co-citation networks and measures of distant recombination
(basicness) through centrality metrics, such as the betweenness metric, can of-
fer interesting methodological opportunities to palliate these shortcomings. Also,
our study is limited to the case of the Canadian nanotechnology sector. Similar
experiments with larger samples or other industries can be used to corroborate
the findings of this study. Finally, our study does not take into consideration how
various practices within the public sector (ex: size of technology transfer office,
faculty involvement with industry, spinoff creation) moderate the relationship be-
tween recombination distance and invention basicness. Nonetheless, one should
notice that various practices within the private sector can also lead to different
outcomes in terms of patent diffusion: one cannot claim that all firms are adopting
best practices and obtaining optimal outcomes to their research effort. Our study
thus assumes that the adoption of best practices in the private and public sector
follow similar distributions. Although this feature is intentional in that its aim is
to illustrate the impact of institutional differences, it is nevertheless important to
further study whether certain practices can fill the institutional gap in capabilities
between the private and public sector without jeopardizing the production of basic
knowledge.
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Table A.3: Results - OLS regressions using EXPERIENCE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NCITFORW 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
NCITBACK 0.0025∗ -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018)
SCOPE 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ 0.0246∗∗ 0.0240∗∗ 0.0260∗∗ 0.0253∗∗ 0.0119 0.0248∗∗ 0.0105
(0.0137) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0100) (0.0121) (0.0108)
CLAIMS 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
TEAMSIZE -0.0032 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0005 0.0082 -0.0018 0.0061
(0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0068)
EXPERIENCE -0.0007∗∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗∗ -0.0024
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0023)
GRANTYEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
DISTANCE 0.2664∗∗∗∗ 0.1727∗∗∗∗ 0.2913∗∗∗∗ 0.2401∗∗∗∗ 0.1449∗∗ 0.1267∗∗ 0.1422∗∗ 0.1188∗
(0.0289) (0.0459) (0.0319) (0.0352) (0.0598) (0.0631) (0.0600) (0.0642)
NPRS -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0007 0.0014∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0014∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
PRIVATE -0.0788∗∗∗ -0.1214∗∗∗ -0.0787∗∗∗ -0.0783∗∗∗ -0.1219∗∗∗ -0.1131∗∗∗ -0.1198∗∗∗ -0.1098∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0383) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0391) (0.0402) (0.0392) (0.0405)
NANOBIO -0.0118 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0376 -0.0653∗ -0.0973∗∗∗ -0.0691∗ -0.1017∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0366) (0.0355) (0.0348) (0.0383) (0.0367)
DISTANCExPRIVATE 0.1191∗∗ 0.1236∗∗ 0.1167∗ 0.1257∗∗ 0.1164∗
(0.0527) (0.0580) (0.0606) (0.0580) (0.0623)
DISTANCExNPR -0.0040∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019)
DISTANCExNANOBIO 0.0691 0.1455∗∗ 0.1822∗∗∗ 0.1456∗∗ 0.1828∗∗
(0.0607) (0.0620) (0.0675) (0.0641) (0.0731)
Constant 0.2437∗∗∗∗ 0.2629∗∗∗∗ 0.2978∗∗∗∗ 0.2485∗∗∗∗ 0.2723∗∗∗∗ 0.3007∗∗∗∗ 0.3187∗∗∗∗ 0.3157∗∗∗∗ 0.3395∗∗∗∗
(0.0461) (0.0497) (0.0542) (0.0491) (0.0512) (0.0571) (0.0630) (0.0573) (0.0612)
Observations 848 848 848 848 848 848 583 797 532
Clusters 284 284 284 284 284 284 283 283 282
Log lik. -39.4256 -2.1288 -0.8163 -0.3000 -1.4895 2.8897 14.2966 -3.5638 8.3555
F 21.2631 36.2711 33.2830 37.5611 36.0163 36.1487 14.7157 35.5227 9.4463
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.1458 0.2177 0.2201 0.2211 0.2189 0.2269 0.2197 0.2338 0.2285
Adjusted R-squared 0.1325 0.2017 0.2032 0.2042 0.2019 0.2082 0.1919 0.2141 0.1983
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.4: Results - Tobit regressions using NBPAT.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
model
NCITFORW 0.0035∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007)
NCITBACK 0.0030∗ -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0015 0.0000 -0.0014
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021)
SCOPE 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0270∗ 0.0264∗ 0.0256∗ 0.0283∗∗ 0.0273∗∗ 0.0105 0.0264∗ 0.0081
(0.0162) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0113) (0.0148) (0.0120)
CLAIMS 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009)
TEAMSIZE -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0097 -0.0008 0.0080
(0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0059) (0.0076)
NBPAT -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗∗ -0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0029)
GRANTYEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
DISTANCE 0.2934∗∗∗∗ 0.1814∗∗∗ 0.3259∗∗∗∗ 0.2566∗∗∗∗ 0.1419∗∗ 0.1248∗ 0.1400∗ 0.1205
(0.0356) (0.0559) (0.0395) (0.0410) (0.0718) (0.0731) (0.0722) (0.0747)
NPRS -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0016∗ -0.0005 0.0022∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0020∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
PRIVATE -0.0882∗∗ -0.1401∗∗∗ -0.0881∗∗ -0.0877∗∗ -0.1418∗∗∗ -0.1330∗∗∗ -0.1400∗∗∗ -0.1304∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0475) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0489) (0.0488) (0.0493) (0.0506)
NANOBIO -0.0249 -0.0245 -0.0246 -0.0613 -0.0987∗∗ -0.1317∗∗∗ -0.1026∗∗ -0.1353∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0468) (0.0455) (0.0435) (0.0485) (0.0454)
DISTANCExPRIVATE 0.1434∗∗ 0.1508∗∗ 0.1436∗∗ 0.1528∗∗ 0.1427∗
(0.0641) (0.0713) (0.0725) (0.0716) (0.0753)
DISTANCExNPR -0.0051∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
DISTANCExNANOBIO 0.0960 0.1968∗∗ 0.2360∗∗∗ 0.1963∗∗ 0.2398∗∗∗
(0.0772) (0.0787) (0.0810) (0.0814) (0.0881)
Constant 0.1996∗∗∗∗ 0.2242∗∗∗∗ 0.2659∗∗∗∗ 0.2050∗∗∗∗ 0.2380∗∗∗∗ 0.2718∗∗∗∗ 0.2924∗∗∗∗ 0.2905∗∗∗∗ 0.3066∗∗∗∗
(0.0555) (0.0616) (0.0671) (0.0615) (0.0630) (0.0709) (0.0782) (0.0708) (0.0750)
sigma
Constant 0.3034∗∗∗∗ 0.2909∗∗∗∗ 0.2904∗∗∗∗ 0.2901∗∗∗∗ 0.2907∗∗∗∗ 0.2890∗∗∗∗ 0.2753∗∗∗∗ 0.2929∗∗∗∗ 0.2800∗∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0115) (0.0132)
Observations 848 848 848 848 848 848 583 797 532
Clusters 284 284 284 284 284 284 283 283 282
Log lik. -332.9313 -302.2670 -300.9739 -300.1840 -301.4383 -296.5088 -172.2752 -290.3013 -167.1253
F 17.6609 30.7631 28.7567 32.2992 30.0669 31.1296 10.5480 30.2262 7.0043
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pseudo R-squared 0.1676 0.2443 0.2475 0.2495 0.2464 0.2587 0.2912 0.2571 0.2858
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.5: Results - Tobit regressions using EXPERIENCE.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
model
NCITFORW 0.0035∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007)
NCITBACK 0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0014
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021)
SCOPE 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0270∗ 0.0265∗ 0.0257∗ 0.0284∗∗ 0.0275∗∗ 0.0109 0.0267∗ 0.0084
(0.0165) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0113) (0.0146) (0.0120)
CLAIMS 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 0.0007 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
TEAMSIZE -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0101 -0.0008 0.0081
(0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0076) (0.0057) (0.0078)
EXPERIENCE -0.0008∗∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗∗ -0.0019
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0025)
GRANTYEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
DISTANCE 0.3017∗∗∗∗ 0.1899∗∗∗∗ 0.3334∗∗∗∗ 0.2631∗∗∗∗ 0.1469∗∗ 0.1248∗ 0.1462∗∗ 0.1191
(0.0351) (0.0550) (0.0386) (0.0419) (0.0714) (0.0733) (0.0718) (0.0749)
NPRS -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0015∗ -0.0006 0.0020∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0020∗∗ 0.0020∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
PRIVATE -0.0918∗∗∗ -0.1434∗∗∗ -0.0919∗∗∗ -0.0914∗∗∗ -0.1462∗∗∗ -0.1342∗∗∗ -0.1458∗∗∗ -0.1308∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0469) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0481) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.0491)
NANOBIO -0.0215 -0.0213 -0.0209 -0.0598 -0.0967∗∗ -0.1316∗∗∗ -0.0987∗∗ -0.1365∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0466) (0.0453) (0.0436) (0.0484) (0.0456)
DISTANCExPRIVATE 0.1428∗∗ 0.1524∗∗ 0.1440∗∗ 0.1554∗∗ 0.1435∗
(0.0639) (0.0706) (0.0729) (0.0709) (0.0752)
DISTANCExNPR -0.0050∗∗ -0.0065∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
DISTANCExNANOBIO 0.1011 0.2010∗∗∗ 0.2407∗∗∗ 0.1994∗∗ 0.2412∗∗∗
(0.0758) (0.0776) (0.0819) (0.0801) (0.0881)
Constant 0.1735∗∗∗ 0.2023∗∗∗ 0.2443∗∗∗∗ 0.1837∗∗∗ 0.2163∗∗∗ 0.2508∗∗∗∗ 0.2782∗∗∗∗ 0.2682∗∗∗∗ 0.3031∗∗∗∗
(0.0610) (0.0631) (0.0685) (0.0623) (0.0657) (0.0729) (0.0782) (0.0738) (0.0762)
sigma
Constant 0.3037∗∗∗∗ 0.2904∗∗∗∗ 0.2899∗∗∗∗ 0.2897∗∗∗∗ 0.2902∗∗∗∗ 0.2885∗∗∗∗ 0.2757∗∗∗∗ 0.2926∗∗∗∗ 0.2800∗∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0113) (0.0132)
Observations 848 848 848 848 848 848 583 797 532
Clusters 284 284 284 284 284 284 283 283 282
Log lik. -333.9356 -301.1838 -299.8981 -299.2148 -300.2635 -295.3960 -172.9004 -289.6424 -167.0619
F 21.8147 34.3091 32.1643 35.9751 33.8361 35.2016 12.3492 34.9323 7.3116
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pseudo R-squared 0.1651 0.2470 0.2502 0.2519 0.2493 0.2615 0.2887 0.2588 0.2861
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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